+ Daniel L. Tavana (2022). “The Unintended Consequences of Authoritarian Elections: Insights from Elite Interviews in Kuwait.” Middle East and North Africa Politics Section Newsletter, American Political Science Association. [Link]
Elections are the sine qua non of democracy. Yet some form of electoral competition exists in nearly all the world’s authoritarian regimes. Levels of competition vary, but this variation belies a persistent reality: incumbents rarely lose. Existing research reects the seeming hopelessness of elections held in authoritarian regimes, as scholars “generally view the establishment of elections as a means by which dictators hold onto power” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 404). Several canonical studies of what are referred to as “authoritarian elections” have uncovered the mechanisms linking elections to the stability of authoritarian rule. My research challenges this conventional wisdom by showing that elections can generate the very oppositional forces they are designed to control. ough elections in authoritarian regimes rarely trigger the kind of party or elite turnover required of democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991), this does not necessarily imply that elections cannot generate other processes that may destabilize authoritarian rule, such as political liberalization and large-scale collective action (Howard and Roessler 2006; Beaulieu 2014). Oppositions are key actors in theories of authoritarian politics that describe how dictators use elections to coopt and coerce rival elites and social groups (Zartman 1988, 78). Paradoxically, this presentation reies the very illusion of democratic governance that sustains authoritarian rule (Albrecht 2010). However, there is ample evidence of elections catalyzing ruptures to this illusion (Bunce and Wolchik 2010), including recently in Armenia, Belarus, and Malaysia. Taken together, these ndings indicate that the ontological status of opposition in authoritarian contexts is contested.
+ Daniel L. Tavana (2021). "Leave! Contentious Politics in Kuwait during the 'Arab Spring'." Breaking the Mold: Arab Civil Society Actors and their Quest to Influence Policy-Making, Issam Fares Institute, American University of Beirut. [Link]
On November 28, 2011, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammad Al-Sabah resigned as prime minister of Kuwait. This was unprecedented: never before had a prime minister resigned before going on to become Emir. The resignation followed a series of political crises caused by allegations of corruption and bribery. These crises were punctuated by protests that grew in size and frequency throughout 2011. Ultimately, these protests coalesced into what became known as Irhal: a movement dedicated singularly to the resignation of Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammad. This case study places Irhal ("Leave”) in historical context, analyzes key features of the movement, and assesses the reasons for the movement’s success.
+ Daniel L. Tavana (2021). "Five for Kuwait: Civil Society and Electoral Reform in an Arab Gulf State." Breaking the Mold: Arab Civil Society Actors and their Quest to Influence Policy-Making, Issam Fares Institute, American University of Beirut. [Link]
On July 17, 2006, the Kuwait National Assembly (KNA) approved a series of amendments to the country’s longstanding electoral law. The new electoral law settled a nearly seven-month debate over various proposals, resulting in a change from 25 to five electoral districts. A broad spectrum of reform-oriented associations and legislators had long criticized Kuwait’s electoral system and the inequality and clientelism it encouraged. Ultimately, a civil movement born from these efforts translated these disparate calls for reform into a coherent message: Nabiha Khamsa. This case study places Nabiha Khamsa (“We Want Five”) in historical context, analyzes key features of the movement, and assesses the intended and unintended consequences of reform in a contemporary electoral authoritarian regime.
+ Daniel L. Tavana and Abdullah al-Khonaini (2020). “Kuwait voted this weekend. Who won?.” Monkey Cage. [Link]
On Saturday, Kuwait held its first National Assembly election since the September ascension of Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah as emir. Historically, Kuwait has held the freest and most competitive elections among the Arab Gulf States. Despite concerns that the pandemic would deter voters from participating in the election, nearly 70 percent of citizens participated. Analysts were surprised that 24 out of 43 incumbents lost their seats, though this figure is consistent with previous elections and incumbent reelection and electoral volatility in other non-democracies. Overall, 326 candidates ran for 50 seats across five districts. Public gatherings were prohibited because of the pandemic, though many candidates appeared to ignore these restrictions. Many candidates called for a range of policy changes, such as public sector reform, an electoral law amendment and an end to corruption. Since 2019, several graft scandals implicating a variety of government officials have led to a noticeable rise in public frustration with both the government and parliament. New faces raise the possibility that the next parliament will take action. But these elections will not fundamentally change Kuwait’s political landscape. Here’s what you need to know about the election - and why the balance of power between the government and parliament is unlikely to change.
+ Kevan Harris and Daniel L. Tavana (2019). “Polling an Islamic Republic: The Iran Social Survey.” Middle East and North Africa Politics Section Newsletter, American Political Science Association. [Link]
Polls in Iran, when conducted with sound methods, can inform us about a post-revolutionary state with semi-competitive elections and a rapidly changing society. Even government-backed organizations in Iran conduct surveys and relay the findings. The Iranian Student Polling Agency (ISPA), a polling organization founded in 2001 under a state academic supervisory body, the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, predicted the outcome of the July 2017 presidential election in Iran within two percentage points of the declared vote returns. The same prediction was also made by an independent polling firm in the days prior to the election. Yet many social scientists who study Iran have been unaware of, or reluctant to use, survey methods, partly due to government limitations imposed on polling organizations in the past. Understandably, many Iranians tend to distrust survey data as well. Or, perhaps more accurately, they tend to distrust survey data unless they see a result which confirms their prior beliefs. Persian-language social media across the political spectrum is peppered with reports of highly-skewed polls, often conducted online with convenience samples, without much discussion of validity or reliability.
+ Daniel L. Tavana and Christiana Parreira (2019). “Lebanon’s 2018 Election: New Measures and the Resilience of the Status Quo.” Lebanon Support. [English | Arabic]
This policy brief explores how—despite widespread citizen frustration—the status quo prevailed. The brief will subject the above paradoxes to greater empirical scrutiny, with particular attention to the performance of new actors. It draws findings from an analysis of election results, participant observation of the campaign period, and focus group interviews conducted before and after the election. This brief also analyses how citizen perceptions of the new electoral law, the entrance of civil society lists and movements, party resource advantages, and extra-legal modes of manipulation contributed to the reproduction of Lebanon’s electoral status quo.
+ Daniel L. Tavana (2018). “The Evolution of the Kuwaiti ‘Opposition’: Electoral Politics after the Arab Spring.” Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. [Link]
Analyses of Kuwaiti politics are replete with references to “the opposition.” Impressionistic accounts—from journalists, think tanks, and social scientists—often refer to the opposition as a coherent, publicly known group of elites known for their politicking in the National Assembly (Majles al-Umma) or for their activism outside formal state institutions. During election campaigns, this tendency to label candidates as members of “the opposition” intensifies as candidates criticize the government in an effort to signal their independence and mobilize voters. The reality of Kuwaiti politics, however, belies these distortions. Since 2012, the presence of opposition in the Majles al-Umma has diminished, largely due to an Emiri decree that amended Kuwait’s election law. This brief analyzes how the new law has limited the opposition’s ability to succeed in light of changes to the dynamics of electoral contestation after the Arab Spring.
+ Kevan Harris and Daniel L. Tavana (2017). “Voter Behaviour and Political Mobilization in Iran.” European Middle East Research Group (EMERG). [English | Farsi]
In an effort to capture citizen behavior and attitudes towards presidential and parliamentary elections, political mobilization by candidate campaigns, and access to various news media, the Iran Social Survey (ISS) surveyed a nationally-representative sample of 5,000 Iranian residents after the 2016 Majles (parliamentary) and Assembly of Experts elections. ISS interviewers also asked respondents about civil society participation, household usage of state social services, self-identification across ethnic or language groups, and family demographics including parents and grandparents’ occupational histories. This brief highlights election-related findings relevant for understanding how citizens engage with the political process in Iran. We find low levels of identification with national-level political factions, considerable heterogeneity in citizen preferences for presidential and parliamentary candidates, and divergence in where citizens receive information about politics. We also find large differences in how candidates contact voters before election day. Additionally, individual-level data is made available on nationally-representative voting patterns based on socioeconomic status, age, gender, and education.
+ Daniel L. Tavana (2017). “Egypt Five Years after the Uprisings: Findings from the Arab Barometer.” Arab Barometer. [Link]
The fourth wave of the Arab Barometer was conducted from April 15-23, nearly five years after the Arab uprisings. Three years after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2013, Egypt’s political and economic situation remains bleak. Since the coup, levels of repression in Egypt have surpassed those seen even before the 2011 uprisings. According to a number of estimates, as many as 40,000 political dissidents have been detained since 2013. The regime has forcibly disappeared citizens with impunity, released execution orders for senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and used sexual violence against prisoners. Recently, President el-Sisi signed a controversial NGO law passed by Parliament that allows the government to monitor organizational access to foreign funding and limit the delivery of social services. Mismanagement of several other political crises has begun undermining the government’s popularity.
+ Daniel L. Tavana (2014). “Preparing to Draft a New Social Contract: Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly Election, 2011.” Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University. [Link]
Tunisia’s Independent High Authority for Elections faced a formidable task in May 2011. The newly created commission had five months to organize and implement elections for a National Constituent Assembly that would rewrite the Tunisian constitution. Commissioners moved quickly to build capacity and restore public faith in elections. The commission navigated the pressures of a compressed electoral calendar, an agitated electorate, and skepticism of the transitional government. The story of the group’s efforts to manage a successful election offers insight into how an electoral commission can take advantage of relationships with political parties, government, and the public to overcome inexperience in volatile circumstances. This case study focuses on commission staffing and recruitment, the creation of regional subsidiary bodies, and voter registration.