Daniel L. Tavana

Most authoritarian regimes hold unfree and unfair elections. But in many contexts, opposition politicians attract considerable electoral support and constrain the policy options of incumbent autocrats. Using quantitative analyses of electoral results and roll call votes, new archival records, and in-depth interviews with politicians, this book develops a comparative theory of the origins and strength of opposition politicians in electoral authoritarian regimes. The book illustrates the theory with an analysis of electoral politics in Kuwait, where one of the most resilient oppositions in the world routinely challenges the ruling Al-Sabah family. Though elections were designed to ensure representation among and mitigate distributive conflict between identity groups, excluded minority elites soon turned to ideological movements for electoral support. As more politicians adopted this strategy, the ruling family struggled to form and maintain cabinets and prevent disruptive activity in the legislature. The regime could not simply cancel elections because their choices were constrained by several strategic dilemmas that compel it to coexist with opposition politicians. Though authoritarian elections can assist the survival strategies of incumbent autocrats, they can also sow the very seeds of opposition leaders seek so desperately to prevent.